Abstract Small and informal enterprises are preponderant in Africa's manufacturing sector. Their growth is negligibly low except when young and small, but little is known beyond this. This paper reports the results of our field study of a metalworking cluster in Nairobi. As competition was intensified by the entry of new enterprises, the education level of entrepreneurs became important in determining enterprise performance, which is reminiscent of East Asian experiences. Recently, some enterprises have left for formal industrial areas partly because their original sites have become too congested for them to grow and partly because being formal facilitates marketing and further growth.
Introduction
The manufacturing sector in Sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by very small and informal enterprises, and the majority of them grow only when they are young, as Collier and Gunning (1999) , Tybout (2000) , and Bigsten and Söderbom (2006) among others attest. Because of the lack of growth, their job creation falls far short of what they are expected to achieve. A number of possibly serious hindrances to enterprise growth have been enumerated in the literature. For example, Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) and Bigsten et al. (2004) argue that small and informal enterprises are reluctant to become large because being large requires being formal and being subject to excessive regulations. Collier and Gunning (1999) and Fisman (2001) among others call attention to market failures in insurance and credit markets, which would be especially serious for very small enterprises.
In their excellent review of this literature on enterprise growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bigsten and Söderbom (2006, p. 260) conclude, while arguing among other things that uncertainty is more detrimental to capital investment than credit constraints: "Improving our understanding of why these major results are observed seems an important area for future research." Another interesting findings is the positive association between enterprise growth and the general human capital or formal education of entrepreneurs, which is reported by McPherson (1996) , Ramachandran and Shah (1999) , Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2000) , Mengistae (2006) , and Akoten and Otsuka (2007) . The accepted view of human capital articulated by Schultz (1975) attributes the value of human capital to the ability to deal with dynamic disequilibria.
How can we reconcile the positive effect of human capital on enterprise growth with the general observation that industries stay at stationary points with enterprises growing only when they are young and very small? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining enterprise data collected from our study site of Nairobi, Kenya. The area is called Kariobangi Light Industries since the local government designated it to be an area for artisans in 1989. Its development dates from the early 1980s, when the workers of formal-sector factories lost jobs as a consequence of the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and began to establish garages and workshops along the main road. They cleared the bushes to construct roads inside the area. The current population of enterprises is about 300, and half of them are related to metalworking. They call themselves Jua Kali in Swahili, meaning informal-sector artisans.
1 This cluster is informal and categorized as what Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) call "survival cluster of micro and smallscale enterprises," which produce generally low-quality products and sell them primarily at domestic markets. Wile networking of enterprises within the cluster in the form of transactions of parts and production services plays a certain role, as in other clusters in developing countries (Nadvi 1995) , global buyers play no role in transmitting best practices and upgrading designs, production layouts, and skills (e.g., Humphrey
2003; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001) . Since government does not provide any support to this cluster except for providing space initially, bureaucratic corruption is limited to illegal levies on factory operation in return for exemption of formal tax payment (Mbaku 1996) . The detailed information obtained from them through personal interviews will facilitate the interpretation of the results of our statistical analysis.
Our data set contains recall information on five years, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2006 , during which some enterprises attempted to improve their products. In the 1990s and early 2000s, enterprises in Kariobangi Light Industries produced low-quality products, and there were many enterprises producing almost the same products, because the production of such products was easy but profitable when the producers were few in number. As the entry of new enterprises continued, however, the profitability of producing low-quality products declined. Instead, improvement in the quality of products, together with the introduction of new marketing channels suitable to the improved products, became profitable. Although this cluster seems to improve enterprise performance by knowledge transmission or spillovers as argued in the literature on industrial clusters (e.g., Humphrey 2003, Humphrey and Schmitz 2001; Nadvi 1995) , the enterprise performance differs greatly. We hypothesize that entrepreneurs become increasingly motivated to make the innovations that increase profitability, and that the more highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in achieving such improvements.
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Although we do not have direct evidence for the declining profitability of producing low-quality products and the increasing profitability of quality improvement, our regression results are consistent with this story. The effects of the education level of entrepreneurs on employment size and its growth became stronger in later years than in earlier years. These results are consistent with the results of the eight case studies conducted in East Asia by . 3 An interesting feature of our data is the inclusion of seven enterprises that left Kariobangi for formal industrial areas.
To our knowledge, no existing study has traced such leavers and has compared the behavior and performance before and after becoming formal. The leavers told us that they left Kariobangi because they needed more spacious sites, and that their relocation facilitated marketing greatly by improving the reputation of the enterprises.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After explaining our method of data collection, the next section describes what products and services the enterprises at the Kariobangi Light Industries produce and from where they came. Section 3 compares the characteristics of the leavers and the remaining group, using the information on their educational and occupational backgrounds. This section also advances our hypotheses concerning the changing roles of their human capital in determining their enterprise performances. Hypothesis testing is carried out through regression analyses in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of the findings and the policy implications.
Data
At Kariobangi Light Industries, no census of the enterprises has been carried out in the past. The Kariobangi Jua Kali Association, however, estimated the number of manufacturing enterprises to be around 150 as of 2006. 4 There are also a number of restaurants, canteens, kiosks, beauty parlors, stationary stores, carpenters, and other Liedholm (1996) demonstrate the positive effect of firm size on the formal registration in Niger and Swaziland. In contrast, Bigsten et al. (2004) observe no significant productivity difference between informal and formal African firms in Kenya.
enterprises in the service sector. We decided to focus on the manufacturing enterprises because manufacturing, especially metalworking, was said to be the core activity in Kariobangi. But we included hardware shops in the sample because the production of fabricated metal products and hardware trading can be done by the same enterprises and because sheet bending and some other services can be done by both metal product enterprises and hardware shops. We also added to the sample the seven leavers, who are defined as enterprises that have relocated from Kariobangi Light Industries to the Baba Dogo Industrial Area or the Mukuru Kwa Njenga Industrial Area by the time of our survey of enterprises. The association identified nearly 150 enterprises as satisfying our specifications. In September 2006, we attempted a survey of all these enterprises, but we were only able to meet the workers but not the entrepreneurs at about twenty enterprises. Thus, the number of enterprises in the sample is 127 as shown in Table 1 . Table 1 classifies the sample enterprises into six groups according to their activities. The largest group fabricates metal products, such as steel windows, steel furniture, and simple machines. More than half of this group produces non-mechanical items, such as window frames, grilles, and furniture. The rest of this group produces mechanical devices, such as scale balances and flour mills. The producers of these simple machines tend to contract out the production of parts to small foundries and lathe turners located nearby. Besides such subcontracting, these parts makers produce simple repair parts for vehicles as well. Also, the lathe turners repair balance scales and parts for cars and simple machines, and produce hinges, bolts, and nuts that are used by producers of steel gates and furniture. These foundries and lathe turners constitute the second group in Kariobangi. The third group is engaged in car repair and is called garages or garage mechanics. Garages here include panel beaters. Thus, the division of labor is practiced among machine producers, non-mechanical fabricators, garages, and parts suppliers. Almost all of them procure materials from hardware traders. Therefore, our study site is characterized by a cluster of metalwork enterprises.
Interestingly, there were also soap (detergent) producers in this metalwork cluster, which piqued our curiosity. According to the owner of a relatively large enterprise producing soaps, her business has no linkage with metalwork, but she and her husband thought that they would suffer no harassment in Kariobangi Light Industries because it was designated as an industrial area for Jua Kali. Miscellaneous services, which appear toward the bottom of Table 1 , include metal and plastic recycling, battery recharging, and electroplating.
According to the leaders of the association, the entry of new enterprises was active throughout the 1990s but has declined since the early 2000s despite the favorable macroeconomic condition in recent years. Such an evolution of the number of new entrants may be explained as follows. The metal products produced in Kariobangi are obviously copies of imported products. In the 1980s and 1990s, the demand for lowquality but cheap substitutes for expensive imports would have been high because such substitutes were in short supply. Noticing that the pioneers earned high profits, followers began producing copies of the original product. As the number of producers increased, parts suppliers and hardware shops emerged, and all of them have benefited from the development of the division of labor. The proliferation of the producers of the same products would, however, lower the product prices and hence the profitability.
When we gave this account of the evolution of the number of new entrants and profitability to 51 entrepreneurs who attended a workshop, all of them agreed with us.
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According to , a similar development process was observed in industrial clusters in Japan, Taiwan, and China.
Another reason for the decreasing entry of new enterprises is the increasing congestion and worsening insecurity in Kariobangi. The congestion has been aggravated by the increased population of habitants in the area. While the area is designated as industrial, it now has many three-to five-story buildings that use only the ground floor for businesses and the upper stories as apartments. The habitants of these apartments complain of the noises and smells coming from the workshops. The hostile attitudes of the new habitants and the inflow of refugees from the neighboring countries have resulted in insecurity problems, which have become so serious that the association has organized a vigilante group by mobilizing jobless young men recently. Why did so many entrepreneurs come from the formal sector to Kariobangi to become Jua Kali? A push factor would be the implementation of the SAP and the consequent contraction of the formal manufacturing sector. Pull factors would be the initially high demand for cheap substitutes for imported products, which very small workshops could easily produce with inexpensive equipment while enjoying the benefits arising from the agglomeration. Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) develop a model in which increases in employment size make it more difficult to monitor workers and necessitate offering higher wages to workers in order to discourage shirking.
According to their estimates, the wage rate increases with the expansion of employment size more steeply in Sub-Saharan Africa than in Morocco. Jua Kali clusters like Kariobangi Light Industries would provide the skilled workers and middle managers of large formal-sector factories with lucrative outside opportunities and hence contribute to wage increases in the formal sector. 6 The high wages would, in turn, weaken the competitiveness of the large factories and lead to further downsizing. Table 3 compares the leavers and the remaining group with respect to the enterprise size for each of the activity types. The enterprise size is measured by the number of workers. We found it much more difficult to obtain reliable data on other measures of enterprise size, such as value added and sales revenues, which seems to be Probably, parts suppliers have less incentive to leave because their major customers are in Kariobangi. 7 The garage that entered the formal sector employed as many as 30
workers, whereas the garages that remain informal had only 4.3 workers on average. Kariobangi. The unreliable supply of electricity, which is included in the third reason, would discourage mechanization. Bumpy and muddy roads would make it difficult to ship high precision products. The narrow space would directly limit enterprise growth.
Relocation to a formal industrial area would sweep away these problems, even though it is costly because of moving costs and regulations, including income tax payment. In our definition, formal vocational training includes technical training in mechanical engineering at a polytechnic, but it does not include the study of mechanical engineering at a university. Instead, the latter is included in formal schooling. We include any training, whether provided at polytechnics or other institutions, in vocational training as opposed to schooling if it emphasizes practical aspects and attaches little importance to theoretical aspects. University education attaches importance to theories even in specialized courses such as mechanical engineering.
Human capital of entrepreneurs and enterprise performance
In our sample, more than 80 percent of the entrepreneurs received technical training or education either at vocational schools, colleges, or universities. Moreover, as was shown in Table 2 , the majority used to work at formal-sector factories. Judging from the educational and occupational backgrounds of the entrepreneurs, therefore, the cluster is considered to be fairly abundant in human capital specific to engineering areas.
As shown in the second row from the bottom of Table 4 , however, only one- though only a few of them actually use them. This increase in knowledge suggests that the entrepreneurs are increasingly interested in the mass production of high-quality parts and products processed with lathes.
In our observation, the entrepreneurs become increasingly motivated to improve their product quality as the proliferation of producers intensifies competition and lowers the profitability of producing low-quality and standard products. However, the improvement of products itself will not increase profits unless buyers recognize the improved quality and appreciate it, as is attested by the case study of an electric appliance cluster in China conducted by Sonobe et al. (2004) . Thus, differentiating own improved products clearly from inferior products produced by other enterprises through branding and establishing new own marketing channels becomes critically important.
The improvement of product quality may be easy for the entrepreneurs in the Jua Kali cluster who are experienced engineers, but it would be difficult for those who did not understand the concept of precision. Upgrading marketing methods and finding new marketing channels would be still more difficult for almost all the entrepreneurs there.
If they succeed in accomplishing these improvements, then their marginal revenue curve will shift upward and they will employ a greater number of workers than before. But the expansion will make labor management more difficult than before. Thus, quality improvement will require improved labor management as well.
Less advanced countries may be able to learn from advanced countries how to achieve these improvements in product quality, marketing, and management. Although these improvements involve the period of trial and error, they seem critical for successful industrial development. In these senses, we call them "multifaceted innovations," even though they do not refer to truly new application of scientific discoveries or engineering inventions.
As Schultz (1975) In our view, the recent relocation of the six leavers from the cluster to formal industrial areas is a result of the increased effects of schooling. Hypothesis 1 asserts that the education effects increased even among the remaining enterprises. Because innovations must be multifaceted, specialized vocational training without much emphasis on theoretical thinking will not be as useful as formal schooling for enterprise growth.
Thus, we conjecture that the effects of vocational training on size and growth will become weaker relative to the effects of formal schooling.
Turning to marketing, our hypothesis is that entrepreneurs become more motivated to market their products to the buyers who appreciate high quality, and that more educated entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in such marketing. We may refer to the buyers who appreciate high quality as quality-conscious customers for convenience. According to Fafchamps (2004) , nearly 80 percent of enterprises in nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa sell the whole or part of their output to the end-users of their products such as manufacturers and consumers and the rest is sold to merchants.
Exports account for only eight percent of their output. Similarly, at Kariobangi Light Industries and a much larger cluster of metalworking enterprises in Ghana (Iddrisu and Sonobe 2007) , the most primitive but still the most common way of marketing among informal artisans and craftsmen is to wait for individuals to come to the workshops in the cluster to buy items for their own use. This marketing method accounts for 40 to 50 percent of their sales revenues.
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Marketing to merchants, i.e., wholesalers and retailers, requires that products of relatively uniform quality be produced in large quantities. In the garment industry in Nairobi, Akoten and Otsuka (2007) find that marketing to merchants is more profitable than selling to individual customers, and that more educated producers tend to have a higher propensity to sell to merchants. A similar tendency is found among metalwork enterprises in Ghana (Iddrisu and Sonobe 2007) . In Kariobangi, however, there seems to be no consensus of opinion regarding which marketing channel is more lucrative or which requires higher-quality products. Instead, the sample entrepreneurs would agree that it is challenging and hence profitable to sell products to foreign or international companies, government and non-government organizations in Kenya, or abroad. These customers are much more conscious about the quality of products than any other types of customers that the enterprises in Kariobangi cater to. Thus, it seems reasonable to count them as quality-conscious customers. Table 5 describes the trends in marketing to quality-conscious customers.
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Because a big order from a quality buyer may come suddenly toward the end of a year, the percentage of marketing to quality-conscious customers for the whole year can be ascertained only after the year has ended. Because we conducted the enterprise survey in September 2006, we could not obtain this percentage for 2006. This is why To test this hypothesis, we will examine the effect of education on the percentage of sales revenues from marketing to quality buyers. Table 5 also shows the percentage of the cost of material purchased directly from factories or trading houses as opposed to that purchased from hardware shops in the cluster or other merchants in Nairobi. 11 Such direct procurement was an important aspect of the multifaceted innovations in the 11 The lower portion of Table 5 also excludes the hardware shops and miscellaneous service providers. The hardware shops procure steel materials from Mombassa. Hence their percentages of direct procurement are much higher than other types of businesses. Some of the miscellaneous service providers are recycle businesses, whose direct purchase is difficult to define.
footwear industry in Ethiopia, according to Sonobe, Akoten, and Otsuka (2006) . Like marketing to quality-conscious customers, the share of direct procurement decreased for each type of the remaining enterprises, but it increased for the leavers. These observations suggest that it is difficult to accomplish the multifaceted innovations in the Jua Kali cluster.
While we have hypothesized that the entrepreneurs in the cluster would be increasingly interested in expanding their businesses, it is difficult to increase the number of quality-conscious customers and obtain space for expansion as long as they stay in the cluster. Such growth constraints are increasingly binding as the entrepreneurs are motivated to achieve quality improvement under the increasingly strong competitive pressure. Moreover, the worsening insecurity problem and the increasing congestion are highly likely to tighten the constraint on enterprise growth.
The growth constraint may reveal itself in the growth regression as the negative effect of the current enterprise size on the subsequent growth. Since the constraint is expected to be increasingly binding, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 3 The negative effect of the current enterprise size on its subsequent growth has become stronger over time in the Jua Kali cluster.
If entrepreneurs have become more motivated to grow and the constraint on growth has become more severe in Jua Kali clusters, the incidence of exodus to formal industrial areas should increase. Indeed, from 2002 to 2006, there were six such relocations out of Kariobangi Light Industries. We will examine by regression analysis whether the relocation and increases in marketing to quality-conscious customers actually contribute to the expansion of enterprise size.
Before embarking on the hypothesis testing, it is useful to glance over the trends in enterprise growth. Table 6 (4) and (5), the remaining group is divided into those entrepreneurs who went to school for 11 years or less and those who went for 12 years or more. The enterprise size is significantly larger for the more educated entrepreneurs. According to the lower portion of the table, the more educated entrepreneurs had higher rates of enterprise growth than the less educated, and the growth accelerated especially for the more educated entrepreneurs.
Regression analyses

Specification
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 3, we estimate the functions that explain the number of workers and its growth rate in the sample that excludes the leavers. Because we are interested in the changes in the strength of the effect of schooling, we estimate these functions in each year or period separately to examine whether the coefficients change over time. We exclude the leavers in order to show that the importance of schooling for good enterprise performance has increased even among the remaining enterprises. The two functions to be estimated include such explanatory variables as the entrepreneur's years of schooling and some other characteristics shown in Table 4 , as explanatory variables. The functions do not include all the variables shown in Table 4 , however, in order to avoid the problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity. A strong multicollinearity is found among the age, the years of schooling, the years of vocational training, the years of prior experience, and the years of management of the current business as of 2006, because the sum of the latter four is equal to the age as of 2006 minus the age of entering school, which does not vary much from observation to observation. We thus exclude age from the regression.
We suspect endogeneity regarding the number of partners and the dummy To test Hypothesis 2, we regress the fraction of sales revenues from qualityconscious customers on the same set of explanatory variables as the enterprise size and growth regressions, using the sample that excludes the leavers. Since the fraction is censored from below at 0, we use the Tobit model specification. We also run panel fixed-effects regressions to see the effect of the relocation from the cluster to a formal industrial area. Here we include the leavers in the sample. The dependent variable is the number of workers, and the main explanatory variable is the dummy variable that indicates whether the enterprise remains in the Kariobangi Light Industry or in a formal industrial area in the year. This variable is equal to zero before the enterprise is relocated and one after the relocation. If the relocation is associated with an increase in the number of workers, the coefficient of this dummy will be estimated to be positive.
This equation will also include the fraction of sales revenues from the quality-conscious customers and the fraction of material costs procured directly from factories, to examine whether marketing to quality-conscious customers and direct procurement contribute to enterprise growth. Although the location, marketing, and procurement variables are likely to be endogenous, the fixed-model specification is expected to mitigate the endogeneity biases. Table 7 hypotheses that the incentive for quality improvement increases over time and that the quality improvement is knowledge-intensive rather than experience-intensive.
Estimation Results
The scale balance dummy has a positive and significant effect in the first two columns but not in the next two. This result would reflect the fact that the active entry of new producers of scale balances lowered the price of the product and reduced enterprise sizes from the top level to the average level in the cluster. The estimation results tell us that similar changes took place among garages and parts suppliers. If the leavers are included in the estimation, the estimated effect of schooling becomes stronger and increases more steeply than that shown in Table 7 . All other qualitative results remain unchanged. Table 8 Table 7 . The results of the over-identification test a la Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) indicate that these instrumental variables do not have any direct effect on enterprise growth.
In the early two periods, the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the growth equation are similar, and both indicate that the years of schooling had no significant effect on enterprise growth. In the later two periods, however, the 2SLS estimate of the effect of the initial employment size is much larger in absolute terms than the OLS estimate, and the effect of the years of schooling is positive and highly significant in both specifications. The result that the effect of schooling was strengthened in the later periods supports Hypothesis 1. To the extent that the initial employment size is endogenous, the OLS estimates are inconsistent. That the consistent 2SLS estimate of the effect of the initial size became greater in absolute terms lends strong support to Hypothesis 3.
Although not reported in the table, here too, the effects of the explanatory variables on growth remain qualitatively unchanged if the leavers are included in the sample. The magnitudes of the effects are changed as follows. Firstly, the inclusion of the leavers weakens the negative effect of the initial employment size compared with the result in column (4) of Table 8 . Put differently, the growth constraint is estimated to be less severe if the leavers are included in the sample, suggesting that the relocation from Kariobangi to the formal industrial area relaxes the growth constraint. Secondly, the inclusion of the leavers strengthens the growth effect of schooling, especially in the later periods. This is probably because the leavers tend to have high education, and their growth rates were much higher than the average, especially after their relocation, as was shown in Table 6 . Table 9 shows the estimates of the functions explaining marketing to quality- Table 10 reports the panel fixed-effects estimates of the effects of being formal, of marketing to quality-conscious customers, and of procuring directly from factories on employment size. In these regressions, we included the leavers. As mentioned in the previous section, the data on employment in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2006 are available, but the data on marketing and procurement are unavailable in 2006. This is why the number of observations is larger in column (1), which does not include marketing and procurement on the right-hand side of the regression, than in the other columns.
In columns (1) and (2), the effect of being formal on the logarithm of the employment size is positive and highly significant, which is consistent with the finding of Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2000) . These results lend support to the argument that the relocation to a formal industrial area enhances enterprise growth by removing the growth constraint faced by the enterprises in the Jua Kali cluster. The positive and significant effect of direct procurement shown in columns (2), (4), and (5) indicates that increasing direct procurement is a part of the multifaceted innovations as discussed in the previous section.
In columns (3) and (4), the significance of the effect of being formal is lost because the marketing variable is included on the right-hand side of the regression and because the two variables are correlated. Most likely this correlation arises from the fact that the relocation to a formal industrial area relaxes the growth constraint largely by making it easier to obtain quality-conscious customers, as the leavers explained to us.
In column (5), however, the positive effect of being formal is highly significant despite the inclusion of the marketing variable. This is because the dependent variable in this column is the number of workers without taking logarithm. With this specification, the estimate of the effect is more influenced by the changes in employment at the enterprises with large employment. The contrast between the estimates in columns (4) and (5) indicates that being formal benefits relatively large enterprises not just because it helps them attract quality-conscious customers but also because formal industrial areas provide them with space for larger buildings that accommodate greater employment.
The dummy 
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the changing determinants of the size and growth of informal enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa, taking a Jua Kali metalworking cluster in Nairobi as an example. Based on the experience of East Asia described by Sonobe and Otsuka (2006), we hypothesized that entrepreneurs become increasingly motivated to make the multifaceted innovations that increase profitability, and that the more highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed in achieving such improvements. We also hypothesized that the multifaceted innovations (and the resulting growth in enterprise size) are difficult to achieve as long as the enterprises remain in the informal cluster. The testable implications derived from these basic hypotheses are strongly supported by the descriptive data.
The results of the regression analyses more clearly indicate that while the relative advantage of improving product quality is increasing in the Jua Kali cluster, it is difficult to find customers who appreciate the high quality of products and to find space to expand operations. Such growth constraints faced by the enterprises remaining in the cluster is becoming more severe. The question may arise as to why they hesitate to move to formal industrial areas, where they can further the multifaceted innovations and expand operations. For them to become formal, they need to be able to generate high profits that exceed the moving cost and other fixed costs associated with the relocation and transformation from an informal to formal enterprise. In addition to such costs, uncertainty seems to make them hesitant. To sum up, while the majority of enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa do not grow partly because of the growth constraints of congested clusters and partly because of the lack of entrepreneurial ability of managers, some enterprises managed by educated owners grow successfully by taking the risk of introducing new management strategies including relocation.
The ability and uncertainty are the functions of knowledge, however. If the entrepreneur is more knowledgeable, he is more likely to generate high profits by achieving the multifaceted innovations successfully, and his assessment of profitability will be more accurate. According to our interviews with a large number of enterprise managers, formal education as well as work experience in the formal sector is the key to learning improved production methods and upgrading product quality, which, in turn, makes it possible to sell final products to higher-end users. To be truly successful, an entrepreneur must convey quality information to users properly. Tacit, non-codifiable, and valuable know-how in metal work and specifically developed marketing channels based on trust with end-users are unlikely to be imitated easily by competing firms in the cluster. Indeed, those entrepreneurs who have already moved their enterprises to formal industrial areas are more highly educated than the remaining enterprises. Even in static environments, educated entrepreneurs can perform better than their uneducated colleagues as the existing studies as well as ours attest, but they are of great worth to their societies when they achieve innovations, thereby creating ample job opportunities.
It is critically important for policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa to recognize that informal clusters may be able to encourage and support firm growth and eventual formalization, even without the assistance from formal clusters and global value chains.
Such developments has widely occurred in East Asia . To support the growth of informal clusters and their job creation in sub-Saharan Africa, it is essential for the government, foreign aid agencies, and NGOs to assist the remaining of entrepreneurs in following suit. An effective strategy for this purpose is to provide between the log of the number of employees and its lagged value, divided by the number of years between the two observations. Numbers in parentheses are tstatistics based on the robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. b. The lagged employment variable is instrumented in 2SLS regressions in columns
(ii) and (iv). to (iv) and the number of employees in column (v). Numbers in parentheses are tstatistics. *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
